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Venture capital syndication plays a pivotal role in fuelling the growth of new 
ventures that subsequently become unicorns, privately owned companies valued 
above $1bn. China has been very successful in generating new unicorns, surpassed 
only by the United States. In this paper we examine the impact of the experience 
of venture capital companies and the strategic choice(s) of the unicorn to grow 
inorganically through acquisition in two areas: the amount of funding available to 
unicorns and the size of the syndication network. It is argued in the literature that 
both of these play a key role in shaping the growth of new enterprises.  
 
We find that the experience in lead investments of the first investor of the unicorn 
has a positive impact in terms of both amount of funding and size of the 
syndication. We also find that the presence of an experienced investor has a 
positive effect on the syndication size but a negative effect on the total amount of 
funding that is raised. Finally, acquisitions have a strong effect on both the amount 
of funding and the size of the syndication.  
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1. Introduction 
Unicorns are privately owned companies with a valuation of $1 billion or more. Technological 
change, coupled with innovative new business models, plays a significant role in shaping the 
growth of unicorns through lowering barriers to entry and enabling them to operate globally. 
As a consequence, those markets where unicorns can be found are often characterised by 
‘winner takes all’ developments – in other words, the markets enjoy rapid growth and are often 
dominated by one company. Due to this, some unicorns are worth considerably more than $1 
billion – Uber, while it was still privately owned, was reputably valued at around $100 billion 
at the end of 2018 (Bond & Fontanella-Khan, 2018). 
Uber and Airbnb are staples of the business press, generating a large number of stories 
as they have expanded into new markets and clashed with established businesses or regulators 
Notwithstanding the negative disruptive impact of unicorns, their socio-economic benefits – 
primarily the creation of jobs and wealth – have ensured that they have attracted considerable 
interest in recent years. Simon & Bogdanowicz (2016), for example, investigate 30 unicorns 
and make a series of policy related observations regarding their growth and development. The 
Economist highlighted the benefits of co-location of start-ups, some of which become unicorns, 
within San Francisco (The Economist, 2015) but also how the fortunes of unicorns can quickly 
change (The Economist, 2019).  
When it comes to unicorns, China has been very successful in terms of its total 
population of unicorns and the creation of new ones. According to latest reports, 37 new 
companies became unicorns in China in 2018 (CBInsights, 2018). According to a PWC report 
in which the CEO of 101 Chinese unicorns were interviewed, the recent surge in China’s 
unicorn population is supported by an increasingly stronger financial sector with more than 
80% of the respondents expecting a new round of financing within the year. The Chinese 
financial sector is increasingly characterised by depth and scope with some of the key players 
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being Sequoia, Tencent, IDG, Matrix, Warburg Pincus, Qiming, Morningside and Baidu. In 
addition, Alibaba, a former unicorn, is also a significant investor in the Chinese technological 
sector. The venture capital sector in China reached $70.5bn in 2018 experiencing an annual 
growth rate of 52.7% (China Daily, 2019). The Chinese government has been very active in 
encouraging this growth by providing incentives to the thirty-one provinces in China to 
establish venture-capital companies to support entrepreneurial activity (Ahlstrom, Bruton & 
Chan, 2000).  However, the relationship between the public and private sector in the Chinese 
venture capital industry is not always easy. As the state-owned companies are required to 
provide a series of worker benefits that their private counterparts are not, there are tensions 
with those that lead state-owned companies and the private sector (Ahlstrom, Bruton & Chan 
(2000) citing Steinfield (1997)). Moreover, the legal, economic, taxation environment varies 
significantly among the Chinese provinces, and as a result the position for or against private 
equity investors also differs (Wank, 1996). 
This paper investigates the growth of unicorns. Rather than focus on the United States 
or Europe, we instead investigate the growth of unicorns within China. In recent years China 
has emerged as a leading player within the global ICT and e-commerce markets – Huawei is 
the largest provider of telecommunications equipment globally, while Alibaba is an innovative 
player within e-commerce markets. Both of these companies are well-known, as are their rivals 
such as ZTE and JD.com, and thus overshadow the other companies that exist within China’s 
ICT sector as well as what is happening in other parts of the economy. While the growth of 
these companies is often linked to the large size of the Chinese domestic market, relatively 
little attention has been directed to towards understanding how the financing of new ventures 
contributes to their growth. Jinzhi & Carrick (2019), which is one of the few academic papers 
examining Chinese unicorns, adopt an approach considerably wider than focusing on finance. 
This paper seeks to address this oversight. 
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With this in mind, the rest of this paper is divided into four main sections. In Section 2 
we provide a brief overview of the theory behind venture capital funding and syndication and 
its effect on entrepreneurial growth and the Chinses context of the venture capital industry. In 
Section 3 we describe the sample and sample collection methodology long with the research 
strategy and methods adopted. The findings are presented in Section 4, with conclusions drawn 
in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature review 
China has experienced a far-reaching socio-economic transformation since 1980 with the 
private sector gaining a more prominent role as a driver of economic growth (Dharwadkar, 
George, & Brandes, 2000; Yu Ya & Li, 2008). Today, Chinese entrepreneurs and SME 
companies are a considerable driving force of growth (Huang, 2008). This change was achieved 
through the development of China’s institutional foundations which provided the necessary 
infrastructure to facilitate and control socio-economic change (Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007). The 
development of a solid financial institutional regime is necessary to effectively direct the 
generated wealth towards investments that are important for entrepreneurial activity, and China 
has made considerable progress in this respect in recent years (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 
2007). However, due to the heterogeneous risk profile of new ventures, strategic outlook and 
growth potential, the entrepreneurial ecosystem of China presents great opportunities for 
private equity investors and venture capital companies, which emerged as a response to the 
exceptional return on investment within the country (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003).  
The venture capital industry is crucial for entrepreneurial activity (Hellmann, 2002). 
Due to a lack of historical information related to entrepreneurial activity and the uncertainty 
that is endemic to new ventures, traditional financial institutions cannot always identify such 
opportunities (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Lerner, 2000). This inability is addressed by the 
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venture capital sector through a process called ‘screening’ (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007). 
Through screening venture capital companies take advantage of the existing information 
asymmetry, either internally or through an extensive network of partners, and identify 
innovative companies with significant growth potential in which to invest (Zhao & Aram, 
1995).  
Moreover, venture capital companies also perform due diligence that explores the 
legitimacy of new ventures. In China due diligence is crucial. Although the institutional 
development has been rapid and continues to evolve, there is still room for further development 
and improvement. As a result, due diligence replaces the institutional void by undertaking a 
thorough investigation of the new venture (Ahlstrom et al., 2007; Zhao & Aram, 1995). This 
legitimacy building activity is fundamental for both the venture capital company that performs 
it and for the company that is investigated ability to attract funding and thus grow.  
Those new ventures backed by venture capital firms experience increased profitability 
and survivability rates (Colombo & Grilli, 2005). Although financial support is important, the 
relationship between a new venture and venture capital companies is not limited to this 
(Avnimelech & Teubal, 2006). Through ‘coaching’, which is the second main activity of 
venture capital companies, they can provide further support in the form of privileged access to 
a wide network of similar companies that have previously been invested in by the venture 
capital company as well as to other legal and financial institutions. Through the systematic 
exchange of information risk is significantly reduced, thereby increasing the return on 
investment potential (Perez, 1986; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  
However, to further reduce the systematic investment risk, venture capital companies 
form strategic alliances called ‘syndications’ (Hellmann, 2002; Jääskeläinen, 2012; Sorenson 
& Stuart, 2001). Syndications take place during a funding round that aims to raise money for a 
new venture. Syndications are valuable knowledge sharing networks and venture capital 
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companies benefit considerably from the knowledge and experience of other companies of the 
sector. As a result, syndication encourages investment and thus fuels the growth of new 
ventures (Tian, 2012). Privileged information sharing benefits both the screening and coaching 
processes, increasing the reach of the new venture’s network, improving its profitability and 
growth (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). Such networks tend to be highly localised to 
facilitate information sharing. In China, where due diligence is crucial, spatial proximity among 
venture capital companies and new ventures is important (Pan, Zhao, & Wójcik, 2016). Spatial 
proximity is important in China because of the significance of ‘guanxi’ in forming and shaping 
relationships. According to Zhao & Aram (1995) guanxi is the bond between two people based 
on the exchange of favour rather than sentiment. Guanxi, as a from of traditional legitimacy, is 
an important force that sustains and maintains network(s). As a result, the location of a new 
venture vis-à-vis the venture capital investors is crucial because it supports screening, 
coaching, due diligence and creation of links among venture capital companies to form funding 
syndications.  
In this paper we focus on understanding how the experience of venture capital 
companies act as a catalyst that generates and sustains a syndication. We explore the effect of 
the experience of the first investor(s) who is responsible for screening and performing due 
diligence on the investment. Second, we explore the impact of (very) experienced members of 
the syndication on later stages of the growth of the company in terms of both the total amount 
of financial resources provided to the new venture and the size of the syndication. Finally, we 
study the impact of the strategic choice of new ventures to grow through acquisitions or 
organically on their ability to raise financial resources and the corresponding size of the 
syndication, along with the effect of the location of new ventures in Beijing. 
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3. Sample Selection and Methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of 113 Chinese unicorns. The initial starting point for creating the sample 
was CB Insight’s annual list of unicorns (CBInsights, 2018). However, the list was triangulated 
against other publicly available lists such as the Financial Times and Forbes. Due to issues 
relating to the valuation of unicorns and the lack of publicly available data to replicate and 
verify these valuations (Gornall & Strebulaev, 2018), we refrain from referring to the 
population of the unicorns in this study as their total population in China. The data were 
collected through Crunchbase pro, an online database which collects comprehensive data 
related to privately owned company. This data is considered as credible and in many cases has 
been used to circumvent data manipulation methods on behalf of companies (Lucas & Feng, 
2017). The criteria we employed to include a company in our sample were twofold: 1) the 
company needed to be privately owned during the study period; and, 2) at any point of its 
history the company exceeded a valuation (exogenously provided) of $1bn.  
The Chinese unicorns of our sample were established between 1998 and 2017. As a 
result, the companies vary significantly in terms of their age. On average, the Chinese unicorns 
are 7.31 years old which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence of their western counterparts 
(De Massis, Frattini, & Quillico, 2016). The oldest unicorn (21 years old) in the sample is YH 
Global, a logistics company based in Shenzhen, followed by JD Finance, a company operating 
in the financial sector that is 19 years old. This illustrates that Chinese unicorns do not vary 
only in terms of age but also in terms of both the sector that they operate in and their location. 
In terms of sector, the most represented one is that of e-commerce: 20 out of 113 unicorns 
operate in this sector which is not surprising given its strong growth potential, especially in the 
vast and emerging Chinese market. Companies such as Alibaba, an online marketplace with 
growth potential comparable to Amazon, or Meituan Diaping, both located in Beijing have a 
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valuation close to $100bn and are, in turn, big investors in the Chinese innovation ecosystem 
(Crunchbasepro, 2018). The distribution of Chinese unicorns among the industrial sectors is 
shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In terms of geographical distribution, the Chinese unicorns are not evenly distributed 
between cities. This is to be expected given the close control that Chinese investors have on 
the new ventures. Close proximity significantly facilities due diligence and coaching. The most 
populous Chinese city is Beijing, which hosts almost half the population of Chinese unicorns 
(53 out of 113). Beijing being the administrative centre of China and an important financial 
hub is expected to provide a fertile ground for Chinese unicorns to emerge. The second most 
populous region is Shanghai (24 unicorns), Shanghai (13), Zhejiang (11), and Liaoning and 
Hong Kong (3). The list is completed with Shandong, Jiangsu, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Hebei, 
Fujian (1) and finally a company, Xiapoeng Motors, for which we do not have information 
regarding to its bases. The regional distribution of Chinese unicorns is shown in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In terms of the number of rounds used to attract funding, Chinese companies were, on 
average, funded through three rounds. However, there are some notable exceptions. For 
instance, Alibaba went through 15 funding rounds and managed to attract $8.9bn in funding. 
In addition, Didi Chuxing, through 14 rounds, attracted a total of $19.7bn in funding. 
Conversely, 15 companies became unicorns through a single funding round that attracted, on 
average, more than $620m. The funding round number frequency of Chinese unicorns is shown 
in Figure 3. Descriptive statistics for our sample are shown in Table 1.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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3.2 Methodology 
As the size of the syndication affects the total amount of funding available to the unicorn and 
vice versa, we have divided our analysis into three parts. The first part is a correlation analysis 
of the factors to identify co-linearity due to the endogenous and mutual reinforcing effect 
between funding amount (total equity funding) and syndication size (NI). We explore how the 
total amount of funding provided to the unicorn is affected by:  
• the number of investors (NI); 
• the age of the company (Age); 
• the number of rounds (Rounds); 
• the region the unicorn (Reg); and, 
• the experience of the most experienced private equity investor and the first investor of 
the unicorn.  
More particularly, we are interested in three different aspects of experience for the most 
experienced and first investor. This is achieved by including in the analysis the following: the 
total number of investments (INVEXP1 and FINVEXP1); the total number of lead investments 
(INVEXP2 and FINVEXP2); and, the total number of exits (INVEXP3 and FINVEXP3).  
Finally, we evaluate the impact of inorganic growth through the purchase of other 
companies and the effect it has on attracting funding for the unicorn. To this end, OLS 
regression is employed. All the variables are positive (continuous or discrete) numbers. As a 
result, to minimise the impact of big outliers, we log transformed all variables apart from the 
regional variable REG that is a factorial variable. OLS regression is employed to explore the 
impact of these factors on the funding that is available.  
The second part focuses on the impact of the experience of the investors on the size of 
the syndication of private equity investors of Chinese unicorns. Within the investment process 
syndication helps to minimise systematic risk (Hellmann, 2002). The dependent variable 
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number of investors (NI)) is an integer and as a result we use Poisson regression (Sedgwick, 
2014). Through Poisson regression analysis we estimate the impact of: a the experience of the 
first investor, and the most experienced investor in terms of total investments (INVEXP1 and 
FINVEXP1 respectively), the number of lead investments (INVEXP2 and FINVEXP2), and 
number of exits (INVEXP3 and FINVEXP3), the total amount of funding to explore if there is 
a reciprocal relationship with the syndication size, the number of acquisitions to estimate the 
impact of the strategy to grow inorganically to the size of syndication and finally we include 
the region as a binary, factorial variable to examine whether the location of the unicorn in China 
has a significant impact to the syndication. The results of our analysis and discussion are 
presented in the following section.  
 
3. Results and discussion  
The first part of our analysis is focused on the correlations among the variables – see Tables 2a 
and 2b. We use correlation analysis to identify influencing factors and to test for collinearity. 
From the results it shows that the latter is not the case. From Tables 2a and 2b we can see that 
the total amount of funding attracted by Chinese unicorns is highly and significantly corelated 
with the number of funding rounds. However, it is not clear whether the effect is direct, 
meaning that investors spread the risk of investment among various rounds, or if the 
contribution is indirect. Table 1 shows that a considerable number of Chinese unicorns reached 
their $1bn or higher valuation after only a single round.  
[Insert Table 2a about here] 
[Insert Table 2b about here] 
Another factor that is highly and significantly corelated with the total amount of funding 
is syndication size (NI). This relationship echoes the literature (Ferrary, 2010; Joshua Lerner, 
1994; Tian, 2012). Venture capital investors reduce systematic investment risk through 
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syndication by sharing knowledge for screening and due diligence purposes. As a result, they 
are accordingly willing to increase the amount that they pledge.  
Finally, all types of experience (number of investments [INVEXP1 to INVEXP3 and 
FINVEXP1 to FINVEXP3]) are positively correlated with the amount of funding but not are 
statistically significant. What seems to be significantly correlated with the amount of funding 
is the number of acquisitions, which provides initial evidence that the strategy of growing 
inorganically through acquisitions in the Chinese market is rewarded through increased funding 
and (eventually) unicorn status.   
On the other hand, the syndication size (NI) is also highly correlated with the number 
of investment rounds – this corroborates the argument that the effect of the funding rounds on 
Chinese unicorns may not be direct (that is, more funding rounds result in more funding being 
available) but instead through the reinforcement of the investment syndication. On the other 
hand, the syndication size appears to be highly and significantly correlated with the number of 
acquisitions. Moreover, syndication is strongly and significantly positively corelated with the 
experience of the most experienced investor across all three types of experience – total 
investments (INVEXP1), number of lead investments (INVEXP2) and number of exits 
(INVEXP3) and the corresponding experience types of the first investor (FINVEXP1, 
FINVEXP2 and FINVEXP3). This provides compelling evidence that investors chose to 
syndicate with more experienced members of the sector to benefit from positive knowledge 
externalities in the form of screening, due diligence and coaching.  
The location of both the private equity investor and the company play a role in the 
funding process of a new venture. We examine the effect of the location of the unicorn on both 
its ability to attract more funding and the size of the syndication. In particular, because half of 
the Chinese unicorn population resides at Beijing, we aim to explore the direction of the impact 
of this phenomenon. The variable Reg is a binary, factorial variable that takes the value 1 if the 
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unicorn is located at Beijing and the value 0 if not. We performed two one-way ANOVA 
analyses. The results are presented at Table 3a and 3b respectively.  
[Insert Table 3a about here] 
[Insert Table 3b about here] 
Studying the difference in the total amount of funding between Beijing and the rest of 
China, we find that it is not decisive for Chinese unicorns to be located in Beijing – there is no 
statistically significant difference between the average amount of funding in both areas (Beijing 
versus rest of China). However, syndication among venture capital companies is significantly 
facilitated for those Chinese unicorns that are located in Beijing. One reason for this might be 
that the population of venture capital companies in Beijing is higher compared to other regions 
of China (Pan et al., 2016). Moreover, venture capital companies tend to favour geographically 
closer companies to facilitate monitoring and coaching (Ahlstrom et al., 2007; Bruton & 
Ahlstrom, 2003). However, it may also be the case that Beijing based companies are favoured 
because venture capital companies in Beijing form syndications more easily.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To further our analysis, we performed an OLS regression to explore how Chinese 
unicorns gain financial resources. In particular, we explored the main factors: time (in terms of 
number of funding rounds), the experience of the venture capital companies and how the 
strategy of inorganic growth through acquisitions acts as a positive signal to attract further 
funding. Firstly, there is a strong positive and significant relationship between the amount of 
funding secured by a Chinese unicorn and the size of the investor syndication (NI). This result 
is in line with the current literature that argues that through syndication investors can lower the 
systematic risk and as a result will be willing to invest more in a new venture (Jääskeläinen, 
2012; Joshua Lerner, 1994).   
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As demonstrated by Figure 3, a significant number of Chinese companies achieved their 
unicorns status through only a single round of funding – when compared to the venture capital 
investment process of western countries that typically occurs through multiple funding rounds, 
this is very unusual (Hellmann, 2002). Table 4 shows that there no statistically significant 
relationship between the number of funding rounds and the total amount of funding generated 
by the Chinese Unicorns, corroborating the descriptive statistics of Table 1, which showed that 
many Chinese unicorns reached that status through just one funding round. There is, however, 
some evidence that shows that the growth strategy via acquisition is strongly supported by 
investors who provide the necessary funding to the new venture to enable them to grow this 
way instead of organically. This strategy is common to unicorns with a ‘all-or-nothing’ type of 
business model that necessitates rapid market growth through either swiftly forcing 
competitors out of the market or entering new market segments through acquisition(s) (Lee, 
2013).  
Finally, Table 4 shows that the support of an experienced venture capital company 
during the first steps of a new venture is very important for the overall ability of the unicorn to 
attract funding in the long term. The screening of new ventures is challenging for venture 
capital companies due to the lack of available information (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007). 
As a result, attracting the interest and the support of an experienced venture capital company 
that is also experienced in leading investments rounds can act as a ‘vote of confidence’ for 
other member(s) of the industry. This reduces the systematic risk faced, encouraging venture 
capital companies to provide additional support.  
The presence of a very experienced venture capital investor has a significant negative 
impact on the amount of funding that the unicorn is able to attract in the long run (INVEXP1). 
Venture capital companies not only provide financial resources to entrepreneurs but they 
support them in other ways such as through providing them with access to a broad network of 
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other companies (legal, financial, etc.), facilitate positive externalities through knowledge 
sharing among companies supported by the investor and provide them with superior coaching 
opportunities (Hsu, 2004). Consequently, when provided with the choice, new ventures are 
willing to accept a ‘discount’ in order to be affiliated with a more experienced and successful 
venture capital investor. 
Building on the discussion of the effect of the region on Chinese unicorns (Tables 3a 
and 3b), we explored the impact of the region (as a factorial variable) on the number of 
members of the venture capital syndication. We found that there is a strong relationship 
between the size of the syndication and the location of the unicorn. As a result, we can argue 
that those Chinese unicorns which are in Beijing can potentially attract a greater number of 
investors. Moreover, the number of investors per round is increasing. The variable does not 
differentiate between old and new investors, as a result we cannot argue whether the Chinese 
unicorn attract new funders or retain old ones. To explore this, the unit of analysis needs to 
shift from the company to the funding round.  
Finally, an interesting finding is that there is no evidence of a dynamic, mutual and self-
reinforcing relationship between the total amount of funding and the size of the syndication. 
Table 5 shows that the size of the syndication is not affected by the total amount of funding 
received by the unicorn, which is not the case vis-à-vis the total amount of funding that depends 
on the size of the syndication. As the total amount of funding is generated through multiple 
rounds, a better understanding of the reasons could emerge from analysing the funding round. 
Furthermore, regarding the impact of experience of investors, almost all relevant variables have 
a statistically significant result. However, that impact is not always in the same direction. 
Beginning with the total number of investments of the most experienced investor in the 
unicorns, it appears to have a positive effect on the size of the total syndication. The access to 
the network, positive externalities and superior screening and coaching renders joining forces 
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with an experienced investor beneficial for other members of the syndication. However, the 
number of leading investments has the opposite effect to the total number of investors in a 
Chinese unicorn. It is not clear from either theoretical or empirical evidence why this is not the 
case; one plausible explanation is that the superior access to resources and knowledge of a very 
experienced venture capital company reduces the systematic risk sufficiently without the need 
to diversify the risk through syndication. Finally, the number of exits by the most experienced 
investors has also a positive effect on the number of investors in a Chinese unicorn. Knowledge 
regarding pathways of liquidation of an investment are always appealing to other investors (Lu, 
Tan, & Huang, 2013).  
On the other hand, the experience of the first investor in the unicorn in terms of the total 
number of investments has a small but negative impact on the total number of investors in the 
Chinese unicorn. Once again, a similar argument as with the impact of the experience of the 
most experienced investor in terms of total number of investments can be repeated – the 
experience of the investor can be regarded as a substitute for venture capital syndication. What 
does, however, have a positive impact on size is the experience of the first investor in terms of 
its lead investments. This acts as a strong signal of the investment’s positive prospects, 
attracting more investors and legitimising the unicorn. Who exits from the investment during 
its early history is not actively considered by investors during later stages with the result that 
the experience of the first investor in terms of their experience does not have a statistically 
significant effect (though it is positive). Finally, the strategy of Chinese unicorns to grow 
inorganically through acquisitions has a strong impact on the number of investors that the 
unicorn attracts and consequently its ability to enjoy more success in terms of funding its 
growth rapidly through acquiring other business.  
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4. Conclusion 
The Chinese economy has experienced a far-reaching institutional transformation (Child et al., 
2007) reflecting the gradual opening up of its economy to the world. As a result, Chinese 
entrepreneurship, now displays remarkable growth in terms of number of companies and their 
socio-economic impact (Yang & Li, 2008). Integral to his achievement is the strong presence 
of a large number of Chinese unicorns in the global list of privately owned companies valued 
above $1bn (CBInsights, 2018). There are three factors that have contributed to the growth of 
unicorns globally. Firstly, low interest rates have pushed private investors towards alternative 
investment opportunities with larger return on investment potential. Secondly, technological 
advances have allowed companies to offer novel value propositions by creating new markets 
or disrupting existing ones. Thirdly, the new business models permitted by these technologies 
have allowed companies to operate relatively easily on a global scale providing arguably 
unprecedented opportunities from growth. As the reduction in entry barriers has reduced the 
ability of companies to sustain their competitive advantage(s), leading them instead to 
concentrate on becoming bigger. To achieve this, they require significant resources in a 
relatively short period of time to implement their chosen strategies (which is typically one of 
rapid growth involving acquisitions).  
In this paper we study the effect of the experience of investors on the process of 
attracting financial resources and evaluate the impact of the strategy of growing through 
acquisitions on the funding process. Our findings show that the experience of the investors 
influences both the potential of the unicorn to attract funding and to the ability of investors to 
syndicate and reduce the systematic risk associated with the investment. However, different 
aspects of that experience have different effects. Moreover, the effect is different on each stage 
of the unicorn’s lifecycle. In the first stage the experience of the first investor in terms of total 
number of lead investments has a positive impact on the ability of the unicorn to attract funding. 
Do unicorns exist in China? 17 
Furthermore, it has a positive impact on the number of companies deciding to syndicate and 
consequently further increase the amount of financial resources that are available. Through this 
systematic risk is reduced by the experience of the first investor in terms of superior screening 
and due diligence, which, in turn, provides legitimacy to the new venture and attracts further 
interest on behalf of investors.  
The presence of a very experienced investor during the lifetime of the unicorn has the 
opposite effect. Due to increased access to resources other than financial ones and superior 
coaching opportunities, there is a potential discount in the amount of financial resources 
provided to the unicorn. Finally, the location of the company in Beijing facilitates syndication 
among venture capital companies and thus benefits the unicorn indirectly through being 
provided with the opportunity to be supported more promptly than is the case for a company 
located further away. The increased population of venture capital companies in Beijing may 
also have a positive effect on the syndication process.   
Finally, the strategy of growing through acquisition instead of organically has a 
significant payoff for Chinese unicorns by attracting a larger number of venture capital 
companies to the syndicate. This, in turn, increases the amount of financial resources available 
and can increase the speed of the unicorn’s growth.  
There are limitations associated with our analysis. Opting for the company to be the 
unit of analysis does not provide a sufficiently granular understanding of both the funding and 
growth integral to becoming a unicorn. Switching to the funding round as the unit of analysis 
suggests one area of further research, but so does combining financial with qualitative data so 
that the dynamics of the relationship between investors. Secondly, as we have only hinted at 
the sectoral and geographical differences that occur, further research in these two areas is 
required. This would seek to ascertain the degree to which being located outside of Beijing 
impacts on the ability of the company to attract resources to grow to become a unicorn. 
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Adopting a sectoral focus will explore the extent to which funding and growth opportunities 
differ, enabling insights into how regional economies grow vis-a-via Beijing. Combing our 
approach with that of Jinzhi & Carrick (2019) would also be informative, not least because it 
raises a number of socio-economic factors that can included in subsequent research into the 
growth of unicorns. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of unicorns by sector 
 
The most populous sector is ecommerce with 30 unicorns, followed by Internet & Software 
services and Financial services with 13 unicorns respectively, Transportation (10), Logistics, 
Healthcare and Entertainment (6), Real Estate, Artificial Intelligence and On-demand (5), 
Education (4), Advertising (3) and just one food unicorn. 
  
Do unicorns exist in China? 23 
Figure 2: Regional distribution of Chinese unicorns 
 
Regional distribution of Chinese Unicorns alphabetically: 1. Beijing (53), 2. Fujian (1), 3. 
Guangdong (13), 4. Hebei (1), 5. Heilongjiang (1), 6. Hong Kong (3), 7. Hubei (1), 8. Jiangsu 
(1), 9. Liaoning (3), 10. Shandong (2), Shanghai (23).  
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of Chinese unicorns per total number of funding rounds until 
exit or December 2017 
 
Figure 3: The frequency distribution of Chinese unicorns per total number of funding rounds 
up until their exit or December 2017.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample’s variables: Age, Valuation, number of rounds 
(rounds), Number of Investors (NI), Number of Investors per round (NI/Round), the total 
investments of the most experienced investor (INVEXP1), the total number of lead investments 
of the most experienced investor (INVEXP2) and the total number of exits of the most 
experienced investor, the total number of investments (FINVEXP1) the total number of lead 
investments (FINVEXP2) and the total number of exits (FINVEXP3) of the first investor. 
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Table 3a: ANOVA analysis of mean difference in terms of total amount of funding between 
Beijing and the rest of China 
 
Table 3b: ANOVA analysis of mean difference of the size of syndication between Beijing 





Total Equity Funding: Beijing vs Rest of China 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 9223372036854776.000 1 9223372036854776.000 .672 .414 
Within Groups 9223372036854776.000 111 9223372036854776.000   
Total 9223372036854776.000 112    
 
Syndication Size: Beijing vs Rest of China 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 319.312 1 319.312 4.595 .034 
Within Groups 7643.608 110 69.487   
Total 7962.920 111    
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OLS: Coefficientsa  
Model   Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
  Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
    B Std. 
Error 
Beta     
1 (Constant) 8.429 .183   46.111 .000 
  log(NI) .448 .214 .286 2.091 .039 
  ROUNDS .020 .034 .094 .589 .557 
  log(INVEXP1) -.206 .091 -.251 -2.260 .026 
  log(FINVEXP2) .178 .070 .252 2.564 .012 
  No of 
acquisitions 
.112 .039 .300 2.857 .005 
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Table 5: Poisson regression 
 
 
Dependent Variable: NI Model: (Intercept), REG, ROUNDS, Total Equity funding, The 
number of investments, lead investments and exits (INVEXP1, INVVXP2, INVEXP3) of the 
most experienced investor, number of investments, lead investments and exits  (FINVEXP1, 
FINVEXP2, FINVEXP3) of the first investor, No of acquisitions. 
Poisson Regression: Parameter Estimates  
Parameter B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test  
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
(Intercept) 1.472 .0842 1.307 1.637 305.567 .000 
[REG=1] -.199 .0683 -.333 -.065 8.489 .004 
[REG=2] 0a . . . . . 
ROUNDS .208 .0166 .175 .240 155.984 .000 
Total Equity funding 0 0 0 0 .111 .739 
INVEXP1 .002 .0005 .001 .003 13.038 .000 
INVVXP2 -.009 .0014 -.011 -.006 35.312 .000 
INVEXP3 .008 .0021 .004 .012 14.497 .000 
FINVEXP1 -.002 .0005 -.003 -.001 13.517 .000 
FINVEXP2 .005 .0015 .002 .008 11.082 .001 
FINVEXP3 .002 .0025 -.003 .007 .515 .473 
No of acquisitions -.132 .0267 -.184 -.079 24.288 .000 
(Scale) 1b      
 
